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ABSTRACT
The resignations of United States Attorneys Geoffrey Berman and Jessie Liu from their respective 
positions in the Southern District of New York and the District of Columbia, and Attorney General 
William Barr’s and President Donald Trump’s persistent undermining of Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller’s Russian interference and obstruction of justice investigations and prosecutions are 
clarion calls to reform the process by which the executive branch criminally investigates itself. 
But there is another critical circumstance—the Special Counsel regulations—that has 
been largely overlooked and has been grossly underappreciated in the public discussion 
about undue executive branch influence.  These regulations are foundational, their 
impact is deeply consequential, and absent meaningful reform there is little to prevent 
a repeat of such executive branch interventions now and in administrations to come. 
This Essay discusses these regulations and illuminates how they compromise not only the 
integrity of investigations of executive branch wrongdoing but also the public trust.  In 
so doing, this Essay reviews a high-profile occurrence during the Mueller investigation 
and explains how the regulations arguably hamstrung Muller during this process.  It 
proposes  a two-pronged legislative remedy that calls for a return to the former Independent 
Counsel Statute with a significant modification, and defends its constitutionality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Saturday, June 20, 2020, Geoffrey Berman issued a statement 
announcing his resignation from his position as United States Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York.  He stated that it was an “honor of a 
lifetime to serve” in this capacity and lavished praise upon his replacement, 
Audrey Strauss, who served under him as Deputy U.S. Attorney.1  Describing 
Strauss as the “the smartest, most principled, and effective lawyer with whom 
I have ever had the privilege of working,” he forecasted that she would 
“continue to safeguard the Southern District’s enduring tradition of integrity 
and independence.”2 
The flowery language of Berman’s statements, however, cannot obscure 
the disquieting reality underlying his departure.  During Donald Trump’s 
presidency, the executive branch’s undermining of criminal investigations of 
alleged wrongdoing within its ranks has been persistent, unabashed, and, at 
times, brazen.  The story of Berman’s departure is merely the latest addition 
to this disturbing portrait. 
A day earlier, during the evening hours of June 19, Attorney General 
William Barr announced that Berman had agreed to resign, that President 
Trump intended to nominate current Chairman of the Security and Exchange 
Commission, Jay Clayton, as Berman’s replacement, and that the President 
intended to name Craig Carpenitto, the current U.S. Attorney for the District 
of New Jersey, as Acting U.S. Attorney during the transition.3  This announcement 
followed a meeting earlier that day when the men discussed—but reached no 
agreement—regarding Berman’s possible transition to another prominent 
position within the Department of Justice (DOJ).4  But what would soon prove 
 




3. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General William P. Barr on the 
Nomination of Jay Clayton to Serve as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York (June 19, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-william-p-barr-
nomination-jay-clayton-serve-us-attorney-southern-district [https://perma.cc/NP9H-
EFSJ] (commenting on President Trump’s nomination of Clayton). 
4. See Andrew Prokop, The Firing of SDNY US Attorney Geoffrey Berman, Explained, VOX 
(June 22, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/22/21298917/geoffrey-berman-sdny-
fired-barr [https://perma.cc/45T3-52HL] (discussing U.S. Attorney Geoffrey Berman’s history 
as U.S. Attorney and the events leading up to his firing, and reasoning as to why he was fired). 
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to be an attempted “Friday Night Massacre” never materialized.5  Seemingly 
cognizant of Barr’s dubious authority to fire him given the fact that Berman 
had been appointed to his position by the judiciary, Berman refused to resign 
and issued the following statement: 
I learned in a press release from the Attorney General tonight that I was 
“stepping down” as United States Attorney.  I have not resigned, and have 
no intention of resigning, my position, to which I was appointed by the 
Judges of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.  I will step down when a presidentially appointed nominee is 
confirmed by the Senate.  Until then, our investigations will move 
forward without delay or interruption.  I cherish every day that I work 
with the men and women of this Office to pursue justice without fear or 
favor—and intend to ensure that this Office’s important cases continue 
unimpeded.6 
Implicit in Berman’s statement was a perspective—shared by many—that 
Barr’s actions were undertaken in an effort to undermine the array of criminal 
investigations that the office was pursuing  “that hit close to home for Trump.”7  
Alleged campaign finance violations,8 Rudolph Giuliani’s personal business 
 
5. Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, A Friday Night Massacre That Backfired, WASH. POST (June 20, 
2020, 1:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/21/friday-night-
massacre-that-backfired [https://perma.cc/YXQ8-9XLL]. 
6. READ: Geoffrey Berman Responds to Justice Department’s Press Release on His Resignation, 
CNN: POL. (June 19, 2020, 11:35 PM) (emphasis added), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/ 
politics/ny-berman-statement/index.html [https://perma.cc/U48L-UP7N]. 
7. Barbara McQuade, Trump Fires Geoffrey Berman, Exposing Barr’s Bully Tactics and Lies in the 
Process, NBC NEWS (June 22, 2020, 2:34 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/ 
opinion/trump-fires-geoffrey-berman-exposing-barr-s-bully-tactics-lies-ncna1231776 
[https://perma.cc/A7W7-8NBH]; see also Barbara Campbell, Ryan Lucas, Colin Dwyer & 
Jason Slotkin, President Trump Fires Top U.S. Prosecutor Who Investigated His Allies, Barr Says, 
NPR (June 20, 2020, 12:30 AM),  https://www.npr.org/2020/06/20/881148365/geoffrey-berman-
u-s-attorney-who-prosecuted-trump-allies-says-he-wont-quit [https://perma.cc/PCL6-A4C6] 
(noting the perspectives of Congressman Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) and Elie Honig, former 
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.); Shayna Jacobs, Acting U.S. Attorney in New 
York Expected to Advance Politically Sensitive Cases, Safeguard Office’s Independence, 
Colleagues Say, WASH. POST (June 21, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national-security/audrey-strauss-us-attorney-new-york-geoffrey-berman-william-barr/2020/ 
06/21/21f7d7ba-b3fa-11ea-a8da-693df3d7674a_story.html [https://perma.cc/8HX9-BPS6] 
(“Among the attorney general’s critics, an answer soon became evident: Berman’s 
departure was neither planned nor voluntary but driven by long simmering frustrations 
over his office’s pursuit of investigations targeting President Trump’s interests and 
members of his inner circle.”). 
8. Here’s Who Is Taking Over Manhattan’s U.S. Attorney’s Office After Berman Firing, NBC 
N.Y. (June 23, 2020, 1:40 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/heres-who-is-
taking-over-manhattans-u-s-attorneys-office-after-berman-firing/2479740 [https://perma.cc/ 
D6HL-QCTY]. 
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dealings,9 and the Trump inauguration committee’s “possible financial 
impropriet[ies]”10 are among the matters the Southern District is currently 
investigating.  As noted, Berman resigned the following day, but only after 
securing an assurance that Strauss would be his replacement. 
Yet, Berman’s resistance might have also been informed by a similar 
episode earlier that same year involving Jessie Liu, then the U.S. Attorney for 
the District of Columbia.  Liu, whose office oversaw the prosecution of Trump’s 
former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn11 and former Trump aide 
and advisor Roger Stone12—cases inherited from Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller—was offered a top position in the Treasury Department in exchange 
for her resignation.  In contrast to Berman, Liu agreed to this arrangement 
and announced her intention to remain in her post until such time as her 
replacement was confirmed.  Barr, however, requested an expedited departure 
date to which Liu, again, acquiesced.  Notably, on the day of her departure, 
Liu’s office reversed course in the Flynn case, lowering its recommended 
sentence in a revised memorandum submitted to the district court.13  And in 
 
9. Campbell et al., supra note 7. 
10. Tessa Berenson, Geoffrey Berman’s Investigations Into Trump Associates Raise Concerns 
Over His Firing, TIME (June 22, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://time.com/5857204/berman-
trump-firing-questions [https://perma.cc/Y9AK-J2Q8]. 
11. Michael Flynn had earlier pleaded guilty to lying to federal investigators regarding his 
conversations with Sergey Kislyak, the Russian U.S. Ambassador, about U.S. sanctions 
on Russia.  Editorial Board, Opinion, Don’t Forget, Michael Flynn Pleaded Guilty. Twice., 
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/opinion/michael-
flynn-charges-dropped.html [https://perma.cc/G6EN-QCUW].  Mueller had initiated 
the case and Flynn’s guilty plea was a byproduct of negotiations with Mueller’s team.  
Spencer S. Hsu, Devlin Barrett & Matt Zapotosky, Justice Dept. Moves to Drop Case Against 
Michael Flynn, WASH. POST (May 7, 2020, 6:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
legal-issues/justice-dept-moves-to-void-michael-flynns-conviction-in-muellers-russia-
probe/2020/05/07/9bd7885e-679d-11ea-b313-df458622c2cc_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
PK5Y-GEQ8].  For further discussion of Flynn’s guilty plea, see Mark Mazzetti, In Flynn 
Case, Barr Again Takes Aim at Mueller Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/us/politics/barr-mueller-investigation-flynn.html 
[https://perma.cc/SB7Q-574L], and Matt Ford, A Presumption of Flynnocence, SOAPBOX 
(May 8, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157668/bill-barr-michael-flynn-trump-
corruption [https://perma.cc/MKY6-5CCW]. 
12. Robert Stone was convicted of “seven felony counts including lying to authorities, obstructing 
a congressional investigation and witness intimidation.”  Darren Samuelsohn & Josh Gerstein, 
Roger Stone Sentenced to Over 3 Years in Prison, POLITICO (Feb. 20, 2020, 4:33 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/20/roger-stone-sentenced-to-over-three-years-
in-prison-116326 [https://perma.cc/67GC-LYV2]. 
13. Peter Alexander & Dareh Gregorian, Jessie Liu, Ex-U.S. Attorney Who Oversaw Roger 
Stone Case, Resigns From Trump Administration, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2020, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/former-us-attorney-who-oversaw-
roger-stone-case-resigns-n1136411 [https://perma.cc/4LZF-E6KS]. 
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May 2020 the DOJ moved to dismiss the Flynn case altogether.14  The DOJ 
also submitted a revised sentencing memorandum recommending a more 
lenient term in the Stone case.  In testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Aaron Zelinsky, one of the prosecutors in the case, testified that 
the reduced sentencing memorandum was the byproduct of Stone’s 
“relationship to the president.”15 
Berman’s actions were plainly designed to forestall—or at least 
temporarily stay—the type of interventionist conduct by the DOJ that 
compromised the legitimacy of the Flynn and Stone prosecutions.  The Berman 
and Liu affairs are clarion calls to reform the process by which the executive 
branch investigates itself.  They vividly exemplify the inherent conflicts that attend 
to such investigations.  And they further attest to the unevenness of the criminal 
justice system—a system well-suited for the powerful and the connected but 
far less forgiving for those with lesser resources, including those of different 
races and ethnicities. 
The DOJ’s Justice Manual mandates that federal prosecutors pursue the 
“common value” that “public service is a public trust.”16  This is certainly a 
laudable guiding principle for prosecutors at any level and for all public 
servants.  Yet, as detailed below, this ethical norm during the Trump 
presidency has too often amounted to little more than words over substance.  
Indeed, the Berman and Liu episodes are not standalone incidents.  Rather, 
they are part of a pattern of the executive branch’s attempts to scuttle 
investigations and prosecutions of alleged criminal activity within its ranks 
and shield the President from such pursuits. 
Consider Trump v. Vance,17 a case just recently decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Vance addressed the propriety of a subpoena the New York 
 
14. Kevin Johnson & Kristine Phillips, Judge in Michael Flynn Case Delaying Decision on 
DOJ Request to Abandon Prosecution, USA TODAY (May 13, 2020, 1:05 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/05/12/judge-michael-flynn-case-
delays-doj-move-drop-case/3107727001 [https://perma.cc/LQ32-BLNH].  Barr also 
appointed two U.S. Attorneys—John Durham and Jeff Jensen—to investigate the origins 
and appropriateness of the Russian meddling investigation and the Michael Flynn 
matter, respectively.  Adam Goldman, Charlie Savage & Michael S. Schmidt, Barr Assigns 
U.S. Attorney in Connecticut to Review Origins of Russia Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/russia-investigation-justice-
department-review.html [https://perma.cc/TJ4Z-PF3R]. 
15. Billy House, Whistle-Blower Says DOJ Aimed to Give Trump Ally Stone a Break, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 23, 2020, 8:01 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-
criminal-law/prosecutor-says-improper-pressure-applied-for-trump-ally-stone [https:// 
perma.cc/LVC7-Y3W6]. 
16. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-4.010 (2018) [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL]. 
17. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020). 
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City District Attorney issued to Mazurs USA, LLP, which sought the 
“financial and tax records of several individuals and entities, including 
[Trump] and entities owned by [Trump] before he became President, from 
January 1, 2011 to the present.”18  Before the Court, the President pressed a 
sweeping theory of immunity.  Specifically, he submitted “that the Supremacy 
Clause gives a sitting President absolute immunity from state criminal 
subpoenas because compliance with those subpoenas would categorically 
impair a President’s performance of his Article II functions.”19  In the 
alternative, the U.S. Solicitor General proposed a less absolute threshold; 
namely, that state grand jury subpoenas that seek the personal records of a 
sitting president satisfy a “heightened standard of need.”20  By a 7–2 margin, 
the Court rejected both arguments.  Notably, the entire Court concluded that 
neither Article II nor the Supremacy Clause supported Trump’s absolute 
immunity claim.21 
Though Trump’s absolute immunity theory failed to garner any 
Supreme Court support, earlier this year Trump publicly proclaimed his own 
legal judgment: namely, that he has the “legal right” to interfere in executive 
branch criminal cases.22  And in the Stone case Trump backed up his words, 
publicly expressing his displeasure with the DOJ’s original sentencing 
 
18. Brief in Opposition at 5, Vance, 140 S. Ct. 659 (No. 19-635).  The subpoena was 
purposefully “patterned” after the subpoena previously issued by the House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform.  Id. at 5 n.2.  The District Attorney also issued a subpoena to 
the Trump Organization seeking similar documentation.  Richard Lempert, Trump’s Tax 
Returns: The Legal Issues and Possible Outcomes, BROOKINGS (May 28, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/05/28/trumps-tax-returns-the-legal-issues-and-
possible-outcomes [https://perma.cc/P3MU-KFSQ].  The Trump organization turned over 
financial documents but did not produce Trump’s tax returns.  Brief in Opposition, 
supra, at 4–5. 
19. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2425. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 2429 (“Given these safeguards and the Court’s precedents, we cannot conclude that 
absolute immunity is necessary or appropriate under Article II or the Supremacy Clause.  
Our dissenting colleagues agree.”). 
22. See Edward Helmore, Trump Claims He Has ‘Legal Right’ to Intervene in Criminal Cases, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2020, 7:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/14/ 
trump-claims-legal-right-intervene-criminal-cases-william-barr-plea-not-tweet [https:// 
perma.cc/2HMQ-FSBX]. 
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memorandum,23 criticizing the presiding judge, questioning the impartiality 
of the jury forewoman,24 and ultimately commuting Stone’s 40-month sentence.25 
In addition to the Flynn and Stone interventions, Barr has undermined 
Mueller’s work in other contexts as well.  Perhaps his most notable intrusion 
occurred on March 24, 2020, just two days after Mueller submitted his Report 
on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election 
to the Attorney General.  In Barr’s infamous four-page summary of Mueller’s 
findings, he stated that Mueller found insufficient evidence of a conspiracy 
between Russia and the Trump campaign and that no conclusion was reached 
in regard to obstruction.26  Nevertheless, Barr included his personal determination 
that there was insufficient evidence of obstruction.27  In a pointed retort, Mueller 
wrote a letter to Barr complaining that the summary misrepresented the work 
of the Special Counsel’s office.  Specifically, Mueller argued that the summary 
“did not fully capture the context, nature, and substance” of the work of 
Mueller’s team, and that the letter created “public confusion about critical 
aspects of the results of [the] investigation,” which potentially compromised 
the public’s confidence in the Special Counsel’s work.28 
 
23. See Lucien Bruggeman & Soo Rin Kim, A Timeline of the Extraordinary Turn of  Events in the 
Roger Stone Case, ABC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2020, 7:21 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/timeline-extraordinary-turn-events-roger-stone-case/story?id=68921601 [https:// 
perma.cc/E9DQ-3V7N] (noting Trump’s comments via Twitter that it was “a horrible and 
very unfair situation” and a “miscarriage of justice”); see also Roger Stone, Longtime 
Trump Adviser, Denied Bid for New Trial, GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2020, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/16/roger-stone-trump-denied-new-trial 
[https://perma.cc/M2V2-3ESW] (discussing Stone’s prison sentence and President’s Trump’s 
strong rebuke of the Department of Justice). 
24. Darren Samuelsohn & Josh Gerstein, Federal Judge Rebukes Trump Over Roger Stone Jury 
Comments, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2020, 3:18 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/25/ 
judge-rebukes-trump-roger-stone-jury-117442 [https://perma.cc/2KBW-33GZ]. 
25. Ryan Lucas, Trump Commutes Sentence of Longtime Friend and Adviser Roger Stone, NPR (July 
10, 2020, 7:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/10/887721441/trump-commutes-sentence-
of-longtime-friend-and-adviser-roger-stone [https://perma.cc/7ZQ7-KPGX]; Peter Baker, 
Maggie Haberman & Sharon LaFraniere, Trump Commutes Sentence of Roger Stone in 
Case He Long Denounced, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/07/10/us/politics/trump-roger-stone-clemency.html [https://perma.cc/NRY7-USHX]. 




28. Devlin Barrett & Matt Zapotosky, Mueller Complained That Barr’s Letter Did Not 
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The flair and circumstances of these events rightfully generated public 
attention.  But there is another critical aspect of this public discussion about 
undue executive branch influence that has been largely overlooked and 
grossly underappreciated: the Special Counsel regulations.  These regulations 
are not fancy and are rather unlikely to ever generate substantial public 
interest.  Yet, they are foundational, their impact is deeply consequential, and 
they help elucidate many of the ills referenced above.  In fact, absent 
meaningful reform there are few safeguards to prevent a repeat of such 
interventions now or in administrations to come.  Presidential crimes matter, 
as do other executive branch crimes, and a fair and impartial structure must 
be implemented to effectively respond to the challenge of addressing such 
alleged wrongdoing. 
The Special Counsel regulations, promulgated by the DOJ, delineate the 
rules and procedures that determine when outside counsel, such as Mueller, 
must be appointed to criminally investigate alleged wrongdoing within the 
executive branch, as well as the rules and processes to which special counsels 
must adhere when performing their investigative and prosecutorial 
functions.29  When Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (in his capacity 
as Acting Attorney General) appointed Mueller to serve as Special Counsel to 
investigate Russia’s involvement in the 2016 election and its possible 
coordination with the Trump campaign, Rosenstein stated: 
In my capacity as [A]cting [A]ttorney [G]eneral I determined that it is in 
the public interest for me to exercise my authority and appoint a special 
counsel to assume responsibility for this matter . . . .  What I have 
determined is that based upon the unique circumstances the public 
interest requires me to place this investigation under the authority 
of a person who exercises a degree of independence from the 
normal chain of command.30 
Rosenstein’s statement hinted that Mueller possessed some meaningful 
measure of investigative and prosecutorial authority independent of the DOJ.  
Indeed, the Special Counsel regulations exist ostensibly for this purpose—to 
provide for the appointment of a special prosecutor in the event of a conflict 
 
29. See CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SPECIAL COUNSEL 
INVESTIGATIONS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 8–14 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44857.pdf [https://perma.cc/39VU-GZKB].   
30. Devlin Barrett, Sari Horwitz & Matt Zapotosky, Deputy Attorney General Appoints Special 
Counsel to Oversee Probe of Russian Interference in Election, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/deputy-attorney-general-appoints-
special-counsel-to-oversee-probe-of-russian-interference-in-election/2017/05/17/302c1774-
3b49-11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html [https://perma.cc/V6DD-EJJZ].  
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of interest within the DOJ and when such an appointment is in the public 
interest.31  Unfortunately, as this Essay will explain, the special counsel 
regulations are inapt for this purpose.  Prosecutors appointed pursuant to 
these regulations enjoy little independence and are subject to the persistent DOJ 
oversight when performing their investigative and prosecutorial functions. 
This Essay will discuss these regulations, explain why they deprive 
special counsels of any meaningful investigative and prosecutorial 
independence, and illuminate how they compromise not only the integrity of 
investigations of executive branch wrongdoing but also the public’s trust.  In 
so doing, this Essay will review a high-profile occurrence during the Mueller 
investigation and explain how the regulations arguably hamstrung Muller 
during this process.  It will also propose a two-pronged legislative remedy that 
calls for a return to the former Independent Counsel Statute (ICS), with a 
significant modification.  More specifically, the presented proposal mandates 
special prosecutors’ compliance with DOJ policies, but allows for judicial 
review in the event that the DOJ denies a course of action proposed by the 
special counsel.  Finally, it will explain why this two-pronged approach is 
consistent with the dictates of Morrison v. Olson,32 the Supreme Court 
decision that upheld the constitutionality of the former ICS. 
I. SPECIAL COUNSEL REGULATIONS AND THE INDEPENDENT 
COUNSEL STATUTE 
In Berger v. United States,33 the Supreme Court commented:  
[A prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.34   
A prosecutor’s duty to distribute justice with an even hand is an ethical 
prescription.35  Yet, in the context of the Mueller investigation the conclusion 
 
31. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2019). 
32. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
33. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
34. Id. at 88 (emphasis added). 
35. The Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function dictate: 
The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of 
the law, not merely to convict.  The prosecutor serves the public interest 
and should act with integrity and balanced judgment to increase public 
safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate 
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that Trump and Barr compromised the integrity of the probe both in fact and 
in appearance with their frequent overt interventions is largely, if not entirely, 
inescapable.  But, irrespective of their conduct (and any arguable merits 
thereof), the impartiality of the Mueller investigation was structurally 
compromised from the outset due to the less conspicuous Special Counsel 
regulations.  These regulations, enacted in 1999 (long before Trump assumed 
the presidency),36 governed Mueller’s tenure and severely constricted his 
freedom to independently pursue investigative and prosecutorial strategies. 
As noted, the regulations empower the Attorney General to appoint a 
special counsel in instances where the DOJ has a conflict of interest and when 
the public interest warrants such an appointment.37  Furthermore, the appointed 
counsel must not be an employee of the federal government.38  The regulations 
also instruct that the special counsel’s investigative jurisdiction (and any 
future expansions of such jurisdiction) is determined by the Attorney General.39 
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on May 1, 2019, 
Barr famously—and accurately—referred to Mueller as “the equivalent of a 
U.S. attorney” who “was exercising the powers of the attorney general subject 
to the supervision of the attorney general.”40  The regulations plainly provide 
that special counsels enjoy “the full power and independent authority to 
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States 
Attorney.”41  The regulations further state that the special counsel must abide 
by all DOJ rules and regulations,42 that the Attorney General is empowered to 
override any actions by the special counsel of which he or she disapproves,43 
and that the Attorney General has the exclusive authority to remove a special 
 
severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in 
appropriate circumstances.  The prosecutor should seek to protect the 
innocent and convict the guilty, consider the interests of victims and 
witnesses, and respect the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, 
including suspects and defendants. 
 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION r. 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
36. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.10 (2019). 
37. Id. § 600.1. 
38. Id. § 600.3(a). 
39. Id. § 600.4(a)–(b). 
40. Department of Justice’s Investigation of Russian Interference With the 2016 Presidential 
Election: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of 
William P. Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen.), https://congressionaldish.com/cd197-constitutional-
crisis [https://perma.cc/H96B-RMHB]. 
41. 28 C.F.R. § 600.6 (2019). 
42. See id. § 600.7(a). 
43. See id. § 600.7(b). 
Presidential Crimes Matter 233 
counsel from his or her position.44  When the work of the special counsel is 
completed, the regulations require the submission of a confidential final 
report to the Attorney General that describes “the prosecution or declination 
decisions reached by the Special Counsel.”45  If the Attorney General 
concludes that publication of the report would be in the “public interest” then 
he or she can provide for its release.46 
Though the regulations provide that special counsels are relieved from 
the DOJ’s “day-to-day supervision,”47 special counsels enjoy little latitude to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion in a meaningfully independent manner.  As 
DOJ employees, special counsels are subject to the rules and regulations of the 
department that oversees their activities.  Practices and strategies that a special 
counsel employs or proposes can be overridden by the DOJ, potentially 
providing a basis for the special counsel’s removal.48 
An inherent conflict exists whenever the executive branch is charged 
with investigating alleged criminal activity within its own ranks.  In fact, it 
was this reality that was the impetus for the inclusion of the original special 
prosecutor provisions in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.49  An outgrowth 
of the Watergate saga, the special prosecutor provisions were an attempt to 
create a constitutionally sound structure whereby high-ranking executive 
branch officials could be investigated and prosecuted by a body sufficiently 
independent of undue executive branch influence.  During its approximate 
twenty-year lifespan the statute underwent various changes.  In 1982 the term 
“special counsel” was supplanted by “independent counsel,”50 and when the 
statute was reauthorized in 1987 it was renamed the “Independent Counsel 
Reauthorization Act.”51 
Substantively, however, the core tenets of the statute remained in place.  
The ICS included a number of high-ranking executive branch officials within 
its jurisdiction, including, but not limited to, the president, the vice president, 
 
44. See id. § 600.7(d) (allowing for removal for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, 
conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Departmental policies”). 
45. Id. § 600.8(c). 
46. Id. § 600.9(c). 
47. Id. § 600.7(b). 
48. Id. § 600.7(d). 
49. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–98). 
50. Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law, PBS FRONTLINE (May 1998), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/history.html [https:// 
perma.cc/PSD8-XC4G]. 
51. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293. 
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the Attorney General, and various department secretaries and directors.52  To 
trigger an investigation, the most recent version of the statute (1994) required 
that the Attorney General, upon receipt of information suggesting that a 
covered official violated a federal law, conduct a preliminary investigation.53  
If the evaluative criteria delineated in the statute were satisfied, then the 
Attorney General was required to seek the appointment of an independent 
counsel from the division of the court.54  This Court consisted of three 
members of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit who served 
two-year terms.55  The division was empowered to appoint the independent 
counsel,56 define his or her jurisdiction,57 and enlarge the jurisdictional 
grant.58  A decision by the Attorney General to remove an independent counsel 
was reviewable not by the division of the Court, but by the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia.59  The statute also sought to require 
independent counsels’ adherence to DOJ policies.  Section 594(f) provided, in part, 
that “except to the extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of 
this chapter,” special counsels were expected to “comply with the written or 
other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting 
enforcement of the criminal laws.”60 
A total of twenty independent counsel investigations were initiated.61  
Though the statute could boast of some successful and just investigative 
outcomes, these virtues were ultimately drowned out by the weight of other 
investigations and prosecutions.62  The poster children of this latter category 
undoubtedly included Kenneth Starr’s Whitewater investigation of President 
Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton’s real estate dealings as well as 
 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a)–(b) (1994).  
53. Id. § 591(a).  The evaluative criteria changed over the years.  The 1994 version required 
that a referral for an appointment of a special counsel be made if the information received 
by the Attorney General was specific and was from a credible source.  Id. § 591(d)(1). 
54. Id. § 592(c)(1). 
55. Id. § 49. 
56. Id. § 593(b)(1). 
57. Id. § 593(b)(1), (3). 
58. Id. § 593(c)(1). 
59. Id. § 596(a)(3). 
60. Id. § 594(f)(1). 
61. CONG. RSCH. SERV., INDEPENDENT COUNSELS APPOINTED UNDER THE ETHICS IN 
GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978, COSTS AND RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2006). 
62. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook III, Mend It or End It?  What to Do With the Independent Counsel 
Statute, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 297–305 (1998). 
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Lawrence Walsh’s Iran-Contra investigation into alleged misconduct by 
President Ronald Reagan’s administration.63 
When the statute was allowed to expire in 1999, there was a sense of 
fatigue amongst Democrats and Republicans.  The statute’s inability to 
control the runaway exercise of prosecutorial discretion was the principal, 
commonly-expressed complaint.  As aptly summarized by Richard Pildes: 
The view was that the act had left independent counsels (ICs) too 
independent of all constraints and had inadvertently created a bad 
incentive structure for the ICs that at times encouraged 
investigations that sprawled well beyond their original justification, 
went on endlessly, and created too much pressure for the 
independent counsel to justify their existence by showing that they 
had discovered some sort of crime that the target of their 
investigation had committed.64 
Even former Independent Counsel Jacob Stein, who investigated former 
Attorney General nominee Edwin Meese, expressed sentiments consistent 
with this perspective.  Reflecting on his own experiences, he commented that 
the statute left him discretionary authority that was seemingly boundless: 
I had no limits.  I was astonished at the authority I had, and I felt it 
was a personal test of my own sanity in the exercise of that 
authority.  I don’t know whether others thought that I passed the 
test.  But I had more authority than anybody should have.65 
Despite the statute’s notable shortcomings, the ICS was superior to the 
Special Counsel regulations it replaced.  First, independent counsel prosecutions 
were comparatively less hampered by the appearance of conflicts that 
necessarily attend special counsel investigations.  As noted, independent 
counsels were, for the most part, structurally insulated from executive branch 
oversight.66  Moreover, appointments were made by a judicial panel, which 
also defined the prosecutorial jurisdiction, and final decisions regarding 
 
63. See Carlos Lozada, Every Report on Past Presidential Scandal Was a Warning.  Why Didn’t We 
Listen?, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2019, 7:40 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ 
2019/03/22/every-report-past-presidential-scandal-was-warning-why-didnt-we-listen 
[https://perma.cc/KG8M-CHY3]. 
64. Richard H. Pildes, Could Congress Simply Codify the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations?, 
LAWFARE (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/could-congress-
simply-codify-doj-special-counsel-regulations [https://perma.cc/DFX3-Q9JU]. 
65. The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1515, 1549 (1997) [hereinafter Independent Counsel Process] (remarks by 
Jacob Stein). 
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
236 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 222 (2020) 
removal rested with the district court.  Second, the ICS produced several 
meritorious criminal investigations and prosecutions.67 
Nevertheless, the statute’s inability to effectively constrain prosecutorial 
discretion was its ultimate undoing.  Approximately two years prior to the 
statute’s demise, Robert Fiske, the original special prosecutor appointed to 
investigate the Whitewater affair, commented at the Fourth Circuit’s Sixty-Seventh 
Judicial Conference that while he preferred the retention of the statute he did 
not “see a practical way to limit the authority of the independent counsel.”68  
How to structure a process that grants prosecutors sufficient investigative and 
prosecutorial latitude yet constrains the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
has vexed legislators since Watergate.  The following Part introduces a 
proposal that addresses this dilemma. 
II. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
This objective can be achieved by reenacting the ICS, with the following 
two-pronged modification.69  First, when an independent counsel seeks to 
pursue an investigative or prosecutive activity that implicates a DOJ policy, 
such as those contained in the DOJ’s Justice Manual,70 he or she must comply 
with departmental policy.  Thus, if the activity triggers a reporting, consulting, 
or approval obligation then the independent counsel must fulfill it.  If the 
approval is obtained, then the independent counsel can pursue the desired 
course of conduct.  In the event of an adverse outcome, however, the 
independent counsel could either accept the department’s determination or 
seek review of the matter before the division of the court.  If the latter option 
is pursued, the DOJ can argue before the Court in opposition.  Should the 
independent counsel prevail before the Court, he or she can then proceed with 
the desired course of action. 
 
67. See Cook, supra note 62. 
68. Independent Counsel Process, supra note 65, at 1550 (remarks of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.). 
69. For a more in-depth discussion of this proposal, see Julian A. Cook III, Executive Branch 
Crimes and the Public Trust, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2021).  See also Julian 
A. Cook, III, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Premature Demise, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1367 (discussing the two-pronged proposal). 
70. For discussion of the Justice Manual, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.  Some 
Justice Manual provisions are inapplicable to my proposed rule (see, for example, JUSTICE 
MANUAL, supra note 16, § 9-2.170, which requires notification to the Appellate Section 
of the Criminal Division of every decision adverse to the DOJ rendered by a court of 
appeals.).  My proposal does not intend to make every Justice Manual provision applicable 
to independent counsel, but only those that fit within the Morrison v. Olson framework.  This 
Essay does not attempt to delineate a comprehensive list of applicable provisions. 
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Federal prosecutors have ample authority to exercise independence on 
matters that are comparatively routine.  If a proposed course of conduct is less 
routine or implicates an interest of special concern to the DOJ, however, prior 
consultation or approval is typically warranted.  The Justice Manual often 
delineates these instances and the corresponding consultation and approval 
requirements.  The Manual’s officially stated objective71 is to “improv[e] 
efficiency, promot[e] consistency, and ensur[e] that applicable Department 
policies remain readily available to all employees as they carry out the 
Department’s vital mission.”72  Or, as more bluntly described by Robert Fiske, 
the “internal DOJ guidance” that the Manual provides to DOJ attorneys73 is “to 
make sure that some Assistant or some U.S. Attorney isn’t going off half-cocked in 
a way that would be detrimental to law enforcement in general.”74 
A. Constitutionality—Morrison v. Olson 
My proposal, which calls for a more elaborative judicial function than 
seen in earlier iterations of the ICS, naturally presents constitutional 
questions, including separation of powers issues.  As expounded on below, 
however, the functions envisioned pursuant to my proposal satisfy the 
dictates enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson,75 the decision 
that upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel provisions of the 
1978 Ethics in Government Act. 
In Morrison, two U.S. House of Representatives subcommittees in 1982 
issued subpoenas to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) seeking 
certain documents.76  Pursuant to DOJ recommendations, President Ronald 
Reagan ordered that the EPA refuse to comply with the subpoenas, citing 
executive privilege.77  The following year, the House Judiciary Committee, as 
part of its investigation into this controversy, subpoenaed Theodore Olson, 
then the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, to 
 
71. It is important to note the Justice Manual only delineates publicly available DOJ policies 
and procedures.  JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 16, § 1-1.100. 
72. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces the Rollout of an Updated 
United States Attorneys’ Manual (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-
justice-announces-rollout-updated-united-states-attorneys-manual [https://perma.cc/86M7-
6VNC] (quoting Rod Rosenstein, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
73. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 16, § 1-1.200. 
74. Independent Counsel Process, supra note 65, at 1546 (remarks of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.). 
75. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
76. Id. at 665.  The subpoenas were issued as part of its investigation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and its enforcement of the Superfund Law.  Id. 
77. Id. 
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testify.78  In 1985, the Judiciary Committee prepared a “lengthy report on the 
Committee’s investigation” which alleged, among other things, that Olson 
lied before the Judiciary Committee, and forwarded the report to the Attorney 
General seeking the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate 
Olson and two other Justice Department officials.79 
Alexia Morrison was eventually appointed by the division of the court to 
serve as independent counsel.80  After Morrison served grand jury subpoenas 
on all three subjects, Olson and the other subjects moved in federal district 
court in Washington, D.C. to have the subpoenas quashed, arguing that the 
independent counsel provisions were unconstitutional.81  The district court upheld 
the constitutionality of the statute but was reversed by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.82 
By a 7–1 vote, the Supreme Court reversed.83  Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, reasoned in part that independent counsels were 
inferior officers; therefore, the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution authorized the judicial branch to make such appointments.84  
The majority further found that the appointment and jurisdictional grant 
provisions did not run afoul of Article III.  Noting the Article’s “Cases” and 
“Controversies” limitations, the Court acknowledged “that ‘executive or 
administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on 
judges’”85 and that this was necessary to safeguard against judicial 
“encroach[ment] into areas reserved for the other branches.”86  Finding that 
the statute did not exceed this limitation, the Court reasoned that the 
Appointments Clause grants courts “in certain circumstances . . . some 
discretion” to define “the appointed official’s authority.”87  And it added that 
a court’s determination of an independent counsel’s jurisdiction was 
“incidental” to its appointment power.88 
The Court also found that an array of other “miscellaneous powers” 
afforded the division of the court under the Act89 did not violate Article III.  
 
78. Id. at 665–66. 
79. Id. at 666. 
80. Id. at 667. 
81. Id. at 668. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 696–97. 
84. Id. at 670–77. 
85. Id. at 677 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)). 
86. Id. at 678. 
87. Id. at 679. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 680.  The Court explained:  
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The Court reiterated Article III’s concern with safeguarding executive branch 
functions from judicial encroachment.  But the judicial powers granted under 
the Act, according to the Court, “do not impermissibly trespass upon” 
executive branch authority.90  Indeed, the Court characterized some of the 
authorities as “passive” and “ministerial.”91  It further added:  
The Act simply does not give the Division the power to “supervise” 
the independent counsel in the exercise of his or her investigative 
or prosecutorial authority.  And, the functions that the Special 
Division is empowered to perform are not inherently “Executive”; 
indeed, they are directly analogous to functions that federal judges 
perform in other contexts, such as deciding whether to allow 
disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury, deciding to 
extend a grand jury investigation, or awarding attorney’s fees . . . .92 
Finally, the Court assessed the independent counsel provisions as a 
whole and took a closer look at the provision’s good faith removal clause, 
considering whether both complied with separation of powers principles.  
Regarding the good faith clause, the Court found that it does not “unduly trammel[] 
on executive authority,” or “impermissibly burden[] the President’s power to 
control or supervise the independent counsel, as an executive official, in the 
execution of his or her duties under the Act.”93  With respect to the provisions 
in their entirety, the Court held that separation of powers was respected, 
emphasizing the inability of the division of the court to initiate review or 
oversight of independent counsel conduct.  It noted that the division “has no 
 
These duties include granting extensions for the Attorney General’s 
preliminary investigation, § 592(a)(3); receiving the report of the Attorney 
General at the conclusion of his preliminary investigation, §§ 592(b)(1), 
593(c)(2)(B); referring matters to the counsel upon request, § 594(e); 
receiving reports from the counsel regarding expenses incurred, 
§ 594(h)(1)(A); receiving a report from the Attorney General following the 
removal of an independent counsel, § 596(a)(2); granting attorney’s fees 
upon request to individuals who were investigated but not indicted by an 
independent counsel, § 593(f); receiving a final report from the counsel, 
§ 594(h)(1)(B); deciding whether to release the counsel’s final report to 
Congress or the public and determining whether any protective orders 
should be issued, § 594(h)(2); and terminating an independent counsel 
when his or her task is completed, § 596(b)(2). 
  Id. (footnote omitted). 
90. Id. at 681. 
91. Id. at 656, 681. 
92. Id. at 681 (emphasis added) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), (g); 42 U.S.C. § 1988).  The 
Court later emphasized that “the Special Division has no authority to take any action or 
undertake any duties that are not specifically authorized by the Act.”  Id. at 684. 
93. Id. at 691, 692. 
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power to appoint an independent counsel sua sponte” and that “it has no power to 
supervise or control the activities of the counsel.”94  It also found that the 
executive authority is not “impermissibly undermine[d]” by the Act.95  
Finally, it noted that despite some limitations, the Attorney General retains 
meaningful appointment referral authority as well as “supervising or 
controlling” authority over the independent counsel, including a conditional 
power to remove.96 
The following Subpart will examine my proposal in light of the Court’s 
holding in Morrison and demonstrate why the enhanced duties my proposal 
would assign to the division of the court are constitutional.  To this end, it will 
review a high-profile example from the Mueller investigation: his authority, if 
any, to issue a subpoena to a sitting president to testify before a grand jury. 
B. Justice Manual—Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Consistent with Morrison, my two-pronged proposal provides the division of 
the court with no authority beyond what Morrison allows.  The division of the 
court is afforded no supervisory authority and is not empowered to initiate 
any actions.  The involvement of the division of the court is entirely dependent 
on an independent counsel’s request for a judicial review following a 
declination of a preferred strategy by the DOJ.  Absent such initiation, the 
division of the court lacks authority to exercise any influence over the course 
of conduct an independent counsel chooses to take. 
Moreover, when an independent counsel seeks judicial review, the 
functions the court performs are directly analogous to activities the courts 
already routinely undertake.  And, assuming that such functions did tread 
into executive branch territory, this would neither “unduly” burden nor 
impermissibly hinder the executive branch’s oversight and supervisory authority. 
Consider the following.  Attendant to the prosecutor’s well-established 
authority to conduct grand jury investigations is the right to issue grand jury 
subpoenas.97  When the subpoenas are directed to an investigative target, 
however, the DOJ requires consideration of other factors prior to their 
issuance.  The Justice Manual documents these concerns in section 9-11.150 
(Subpoenaing Targets of the Investigation), noting that such subpoenas “may 
 
94. Id. at 695. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 696. 
97. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate 
Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1705 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. 
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carry the appearance of unfairness,” that “the potential for misunderstanding 
is great,” and that federal prosecutors should initially attempt to obtain “the 
target’s voluntary appearance.”98  If, however, such an agreement cannot be 
obtained, then prior clearance must be received from either “the United States 
Attorney or the responsible Assistant Attorney General.”99  The provision also 
details the following three criteria by which such subpoena requests will be assessed: 
The importance to the successful conduct of the grand jury’s 
investigation of the testimony or other information sought; 
Whether the substance of the testimony or other information 
sought could be provided by other witnesses; and 
Whether the questions the prosecutor and the grand jurors intend 
to ask or the other information sought would be protected by a valid 
claim of privilege.100 
There was considerable speculation that Mueller might issue Trump a 
grand jury subpoena ad testificandum.101  For over a year, Mueller and 
Trump’s defense team engaged in negotiations to secure Trump’s testimony.  
But an agreement for a voluntary appearance was never reached and a 
subpoena was never issued.  In his final report, Mueller stated that “while we 
believed that we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury 
subpoena to obtain the President’s testimony, we chose not to do so.”102  And 
in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Mueller explained 
further that his decision was dictated by his desire to avoid a protracted legal 
battle and to conclude the investigation.103 
It is worth considering, however, whether Mueller’s decision was also 
influenced by the section 9-11.150 review process.104  Given the immense 
 
98. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 16, § 9-11.150. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. See Nelson W. Cunningham, Has Mueller Subpoenaed the President?, POLITICO MAG. 
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/31/has-robert-
mueller-subpoenaed-trump-222060 [https://perma.cc/BU9S-TYS9]. 
102. Eric Lach, Robert Mueller Let Donald Trump Duck Direct Questions About Obstruction, NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 18, 2019, 1:52 PM), https://www.newyorker.com/news/current/robert-mueller-
let-donald-trump-duck-direct-questions-about-obstruction [https://perma.cc/5KN6-8CC7]. 
103. Alan Neuhauser, Mueller Explains Why He Didn’t Subpoena Trump, U.S. NEWS (July 24, 
2019, 4:14 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-07-24/robert-
mueller-explains-why-he-didnt-subpoena-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/3QWH-HLAQ]. 
104. Mueller’s authorization was threefold: to investigate 1) “any links and/or coordination 
between the Russian government and . . . the [Trump] campaign”; 2) “matters that 
arose . . . directly from the investigation;” and 3) “any other matters within the scope of 
28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).”  1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 11 
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political pressures faced by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein—who 
at the time was serving as Acting Attorney General, was overseeing the 
Mueller investigation, and was under threats of removal—it is reasonable to 
wonder whether Mueller had been, at the very least, indirectly discouraged 
from issuing a subpoena.  The elongated negotiations between Mueller and 
Trump produced only an agreement requiring the President to provide 
written responses to questions Mueller posed.  Mueller later testified that he 
generally found Trump’s responses to be untruthful,105 and his final report 
indicated that Trump failed to answer any questions relevant to the obstruction 
inquiry.106  If the section 9-11.150 review truly culminated in unequivocal DOJ 
support, it is difficult to fathom why Mueller, in such a high-profile matter 
involving a seemingly unrepentant and recalcitrant individual, would 
ultimately elect to forgo a subpoena fight and terminate the investigation.  
Perhaps the reality of Mueller’s post–section 9-11.150 world left him with 
little, if any, plausible options beyond engaging the Trump team to secure a 
presidential interview. 
Irrespective of the accuracy of such speculation, the proposal set forth in 
this Essay would have afforded Mueller the freedom to pursue a judicial 
review in the event of an adverse section 9-11.150 determination.  It would 
have afforded him independence that could have potentially altered the 
course of conduct he ultimately adopted.  And it is a review process that fits 
within the Morrison framework, as it requires nothing more from courts than 
the steps they routinely perform with respect to subpoenas. 
Subpoenas are judicial orders that courts are empowered to enforce, 
modify or quash.107  The judiciary routinely adjudicates claims of allegedly 
unreasonable or oppressive subpoenas and has the authority to hold 
 
(2019).  Section 600.4(a) extends a special counsel’s investigative and prosecutorial 
jurisdiction to “federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere 
with, the Special Counsel’s investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, 
destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.”  28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a) (2019).  It 
was “a series of actions by the President that related to the Russian-interference 
investigations, including the President’s conduct towards the law enforcement officials 
overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events” that subjected Trump 
to a section 600.4(a) investigation, 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT 
ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
3 (2019), and likely triggered a section 9-11.150 consultation mandate. 
105. Charlie Savage, Mueller’s Skepticism of Trump’s Truthfulness Heightens Impeachment Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/trump-written-
answers-mueller.html [https://perma.cc/KH6T-GJLB]. 
106. Lach, supra note 102. 
107. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. 
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individuals and entities in contempt for failure to comply.108  The proposal set 
forth in this Essay—which merely empowers the division of the court to 
decide whether a subpoena should issue—does nothing to expand upon this 
preexisting authority.  Moreover, the proposal does not empower the division 
of the court to initiate any supervisory, oversight, or affirmative action with 
respect to independent counsel conduct. 
C. Justice Manual—Additional Sections 
Section 9-11.150 is but one among a myriad of DOJ policies delineated 
in the Justice Manual that govern the conduct of federal prosecutors.  And it 
is plainly foreseeable that future special prosecutors will, like Mueller, find 
themselves subject to one or more of these provisions.  Some, such as section 9-
13.400 and section 9-13.410—provisions analogous to section 9-11.150—concern, 
respectively, the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to the news media and to 
attorneys regarding client information.109 
The breadth of the Justice Manual, however, extends well beyond 
subpoenas and reaches many forms of pretrial prosecutorial conduct.  For 
example, prosecutors who seek to release grand jury materials,110 to engage in 
certain types of oral and wire interception of communications,111 to submit 
search warrant applications that seek documents in the possession of 
attorneys, doctors, and members of the clergy,112 and to indict individuals for 
specified crimes113 are subject to the Manual’s provisions.  It also applies to a 
certain category of pen register requests,114 to investigations and prosecutions 
of alleged perjury before the U.S. Congress,115 to matters involving campaign 
finance violations,116 and to the resolution of cases by virtue of nolo contendere 
or Alford pleas.117 
 
108. Id. 
109. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 16, §§ 9-13.400 to .410. 
110. Id. § 9-11.260. 
111. Id. §§ 9-7.110 to .111. 
112. Id. § 9-19.220. 
113. Id. §§ 9-60.1200 (civil disturbances and riots), –63.221 (aircraft sabotage), –90.020 
(national security). 
114. Id. § 9-7.500. 
115. Id. § 9-69.200. 
116. Id. § 9-85.210. 
117. Id. §§ 9-16.010 to .015.  An individual who enters a nolo contendere (or no contest) plea 
does not admit his guilt but accepts the court’s imposition of punishment.  Ramy 
Simpson, Nolo Contendere Convictions: The Effect of No Confession in Future Criminal 
Proceedings, CRIM. L. PRAC., Spring 2019, at 25.  A person enters an Alford plea when he 
pleads guilty but maintains his innocence.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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The Manual also addresses investigative and prosecutorial practices that 
target certain classifications of individuals.  Illustrative are provisions that require 
consultation before monitoring oral conversations,118 submitting certain 
search warrant applications,119 and proposing plea agreements120 when the 
targets are members of congress, federal judges, governors, and lieutenant 
governors.  Even certain posttrial conduct requires prior consultation or 
approval, such as pursuing appeals in cases that involve national security,121 
appealing adverse judicial orders, and requesting en banc review.122  In the 
context of my proposal, each of these Justice Manual provisions would also 
require the division of the court to engage in tasks directly analogous to 
functions it routinely performs, such as approving or disapproving search 
warrants, oral or wire interceptions, and pen register requests; approving or 
disapproving guilty pleas and plea agreements; assessing the propriety of 
indictments; and assessing the propriety of appeals. 
The Justice Manual regulations identified in this Essay constitute a small 
sample of the wide swath of DOJ policies and procedures that regulate federal 
prosecutors’ conduct.  A return to the ICS with the substantial modifications 
set forth in this Essay would produce the constitutionally sound paradigm 
that has thus far been elusive.  This delicate balance between the exercise of 
prosecutorial independence accompanied by sufficient constraints can be 
achieved by making select Justice Manual provisions applicable to 
independent counsel conduct accompanied by the option of division of the 
court review. 
CONCLUSION 
Among the byproducts of the Watergate saga was the enactment of the ICS.  
At the time, it was readily understood that executive branch investigations of 
alleged criminal wrongdoing within its ranks were fraught with inherent 
conflicts.  Despite some arguable success stories, both political parties readily 
agreed that the ICS also produced high-profile criminal investigations that 
were deeply problematic.  Chief among the complaints was the statute’s 
inability to constrain the wayward exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  Unable 
 
118. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 16, § 9-7.302(A)(2). 
119. Id. § 9-85.110. 
120. Id. § 9-16.110. 
121. Id. § 9-90.020. 
122. Id. § 9-2.170. 
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to develop a suitable fix, legislators abandoned the statute and substituted it with 
a set of regulations that effectively represent a return to yesteryear. 
The Mueller investigation should serve as an important lesson that was 
taught by Watergate but went unheeded in the scandal’s aftermath.  Like 
Berman and Liu, Mueller was never an independent actor.  His investigation 
was hamstrung from the outset.  And in the end, Mueller submitted an 
incomplete final report that was compromised by an Attorney General who 
persistently undercut his efforts.  No reform proposal can cure all the ills 
associated with the current structure, and even under my proposal, room 
remains for the exercise of Attorney General, judicial, and prosecutorial bias.  
Yet, for investigations and prosecutions of executive branch wrongdoing to 
have genuine and steadfast legitimacy in appearance and in fact, a prosecutor 
must be sufficiently independent.  And to maintain this legitimacy, the 
exercise of that discretion must be properly channeled.  The proposal set forth 
in this Essay helps achieve this critical objective. 
  
